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<ATX> When looking at a painting, we have the sense of “loading” its 
contents, in full color and detail, into conscious experience. The 
physiology and psychology of vision shows that the reality is very 
different. We “take in” a picture in a series of snippets, as our eyes 
scan the image. The illusion of being able fully to grasp the whole 
arises because, almost as soon as we query some aspect of color or 
detail, our eyes race to find the answer so quickly that it seems to 
have been available all along. The information is, at it were, at our 
“visual fingertips.” Thus, we spend time looking at a painting not 
merely to interrogate its meaning, but to explore its basic visual 
properties.  
 
<TX-N> Why does looking at a painting take so long? Looking at Breughel 
the Elder’s Landscape with the Fall of Icarus (Royal Museums of Fine 
Arts of Belgium, Brussels), for example, we feel that we are somehow 
taking in the entire painting within a single visual “gulp.” We see the 
steep hillside, the ploughman blithely tilling his field, the great 
galleons and placid sea below; the rich red of the ploughman’s shirt, 
the pale green of the sea, the whitish-yellow of the evening sky. All 
of this, and much more, seems somehow to fuse into a complex, 
fascinating and harmonious whole, a loaded, in its entirety, into our 
conscious experience. So why do we continue to look, to examine, to 
scrutinize, and to ponder? Have we not mentally “hoovered up” 
Breughel’s painting within little more than a glance? 
 
<TX> It is natural to suspect that the purpose of extended looking is 
about direction our attention and our powers of analysis. 
Unreflectively, we may feel we “see” the entire painting at once. But 
the focus of our interest shifts, now to the galleon, now to the 
ploughman, now to his horse (which we may not previous have noted), 
then to the shepherd and his staff and, now we come to notice it, a 
scatter of sheep, and then out to sea. Eventually, we notice a splash, 
and two flailing legs disappearing into the sea; this is Icarus, as it 
turns out, who has foolishly flown too close to the sun (Breughel’s 
painting is, admittedly, unusual in presenting its principal subject 
quite so discreetly). This tragedy occurs in an otherwise peaceful 
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scene, and seems to pass unnoticed. In Auden puts it in his poem Musée 
des Beaux Arts [1],  
 
…the expensive delicate ship that must have seen 
Something amazing, a boy falling out of the sky,  
Had somewhere to get to and sailed calmly on. 
Yet such reflections steal upon us only gradually.  
 
Seeing the painting for the first time, indeed, one might fail to 
notice Icarus, though central figure in the narrative depicted by the 
painting, entirely---lost among the clutter of seemingly minor details.  
 
It is easy to imagine that, of course, we “see” all such details merely 
by looking at the painting---but that we can only pay attention to, and 
draw implications from, aspects of our conscious experience one by one.  
This could scarcely be further from the truth. One clue that our 
subjective sense of visually “grasping” an entire painting must be an 
illusion is that the sensitivity of our visual system is extremely 
unevenly distributed across the visual field. The retina has two kinds 
of light-sensitive receptors: cones, which allow us to pick up color 
and fine detail, and rods, which are primarily specialized in the 
detection of change and motion. The cone cells are heavily concentrated 
in the fovea, a small pit of very densely packed cone cells, which give 
us high definition and color in a region of roughly five degree of 
visual angle---with precise detail being picked-up in a small region at 
its center (the foveola), over a region of just one degree of visual 
angle [2]. Thus, while standing before Breughel’s painting, the sense 
of simultaneously loading its full color and detail into our visual 
experience is a fake: we just don’t have the retinal ‘machinery’ to 
hoover up all this information in a single moment. Indeed, outside the 
five degrees of visual angle picked up by the fovea we are almost 
entirely color blind---and our ability to pick out fine detail is 
extremely more modest. 
 
The limits of our vision are, indeed, much more radical still. A 
particularly striking illustration comes from an experimental method 
call gaze-contingent eye tracking. The experimental participants look 
at the computer screen displaying the image of interest, while their 
gaze is accurately monitored by an eye tracker. The contents of the 
computer screen can almost instantaneously be modified, each time a 
person’s eyes jump to a new location in the image (the eye typically 
moves in discrete saccades, rather than in continuous motion). With 
this paradigm, it is possible, for example, to display a line of, say 
English, text where letters are visible only in a 15 character “window” 
around the current fixation point; everywhere else, words are replaced 
by blocks of xs [3].   
 
If we could load visual impression an entire line of text into our 
conscious experience, we would have the peculiar impression of seeing a 
coherent chunk of English hopping around against the background of xs. 
In fact, though, we see nothing unusual. Indeed, reading proceeds 
entirely normally, and the participant has the impression that they are 
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looking at an entire sentence, rather than a sequence of partial 
fragments. Another clue to the astonishing limits of human vision is 
given by the fact, in normal reading, our eyes hop along the line of 
text roughly one word at a time (sometimes skipping short, highly 
predictable, words; and sometimes taking two glimpses at long and 
unpredictable words). Indeed, roughly speaking, we can only identify 
one word at a time [4] --- yet, glancing at the text we have a strong 
impression of simultaneous visual awareness of entire paragraphs. Yet 
almost all of these paragraph (where we are not directing our foveola) 
could be replaced by xs, or gibberish and we would never now it.  
 
The way brains process scenes, whether photographic or painted, 
parallels that for reading. It turns out, for example that, using gaze 
contingent eye tracking as before, images can be doctored such that 
large, highly visible objects (perhaps one of Breughel’s galleons) can 
blink alternately in and out of existence each time we move our eyes 
[5].  And we will never notice, until we happen to make an eye movement 
within, or sufficiently near to, that object [6]. Just as our brain 
represents just one word at a time, it seems that our brain can only 
represent one object the time (although an object might be the entire 
form of the ploughman, the shape of one of his shoes, or a strut of his 
plough). Indeed, in the rare neuropsychological disorder of 
simultagnosia, the illusion of visual complexity is undone: people with 
this condition report seeing only one object at a time. The rest of the 
visual field is simply blank. It appears that simultagnosia arises when 
the brain’s ability to disengage from the current object, and move 
rapidly and fluently to the next, is disrupted; and the brain can no 
longer weave the illusory impression of a full and rich visual scene 
[7].  
 
The subjective impression that a painting, or our entire surroundings, 
are loaded in full color and detail into our consciousness has been 
termed the Grand Illusion [8]. The neuroscientist Donald MacKay [9] 
brilliantly illustrated how the illusion works, by considering the 
parallel with touch. Consider, he asked, what it feels like to hold an 
everyday object, with one’s eyes closed. We can sense the continuity 
and solidity of an object: whether it is rigid (like a phone, a pen or 
a tennis racket) or flexible (like a notepad or a piece of flex).  
 
MacKay notes how strange it is that we ‘feel’ the entire object and its 
movement, even though our fingers are in contact with it at only a few 
points---and, indeed, as we move turn the object over in our hands, 
even those ‘touch-points’ themselves are continually changing. How it 
is that we ‘feel’ the entire object, rather than a few ‘spots’ of 
disconnected sensation?  
 
MacKay suggested that the felt existence of the object lies not just in 
the current momentary sensations at the fingers, but in our sense of 
their potentialities. That is, our internal mental model of, say, a 
ruler or a tennis racket, tells us what we should expect if we start to 
manipulate it—the anticipated forces, twists, judders, from potential 
manipulations. The sense of the reality of the whole is confirmed each 
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time these expectations are confirmed. But, of course, that sense is 
immediately violated, or at least, transformed, if they are not. 
Recall, for example, the shock we have when picking up a cup and 
finding the handle comes away in our hand; fumbling along a solid wall 
only to across an unexpected doorway; or coming to the bottom of a 
staircase only to find there is an unexpected extra step, or one fewer 
than we envisaged.  
 
The essential point is that we ‘experience’ the whole object or scene, 
when we are clearly merely touching, or brushing against, tiny 
fragments of it at any moment. But seeing is no different: our fovea 
‘touches’ a text, scene or painting; it “lands” fleetingly on some 
particular element of the scene before us (now Icarus’s pale legs, now 
the rigging of the great galleon). And, as with touch, we can actively 
explore the visual world at will, exploring one element of the scene 
after another in rapid succession. 
 
Thinking about the purpose of perception, from a moment, this all makes 
good sense. The purpose of perception is, among other things, to tell 
us what in the world around us---the layout of words, faces, objects, 
patterns that surround us. And this world is, of course, defined in 
precise detail and full color, irrespective of where we happened to be 
looking at the time, or, for that matter, whether our eyes are open or 
closed, or whether we are even present at all.  
 
Thus, the brain has the goal of telling us how the world (or a work of 
art) is---not reporting irrelevant details of where we are looking 
[10]. So our brain “tells us” that the perceptual world is solid, 
stable, richly detailed, and highly colored. It does not let us in on 
the secret that we are viewing the world through a narrow spotlight of 
precision and color, surrounded by deepening grey fog. If it did so, we 
would have the sense of the outside, and Breughel’s painting, as 
undergoing remarkable changes as we scan our eyes across it---some 
items would suddenly snap into focus and color, while others would 
become vague and grey. But this would, of course, be entirely 
misleading--- our experience would be suggesting wild flux even as we 
scan and examine and utterly still painting or scene.  
 
In the light of the sequential nature of vision, it is clear that 
looking at a painting must inevitably takes a significant amount of 
time---a glance will pick up no more than one or a few visual fragment. 
How long do we actually look? Two studies of museum goers, one at the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art [11] and the other at the Art Institute of 
Chicago [12] found that typical looking times at well-known paintings 
are fairly long, but enormously variable.  The modal (i.e., most 
common) looking time was about ten seconds---enough, perhaps, roughly 
to parse the painting, and to decide that it holds no great interest. 
On the other hand, viewers will sometimes spend a great deal of time 
and attention, perhaps up to a few minutes, scrutinizing paintings that 
particularly attract their attention.  
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When scanning an individual photograph or painting, our gaze falls very 
unevenly, typically focusing heavily on people, and especially faces, 
as our brain actively attempts to reconstruct the scene. Looking at a 
single face, our gaze hops, primarily, in a triangular region composing 
eyes and the mouth, which are, of course, particularly indicative of 
both identity and emotional expression [13]. In a typical viewing 
episode, though, most parts of most pictures will never directly be 
inspected at all. This pattern is consistent with the skewed 
distribution of attention and other resources that is typical in 
exploration and search problems of all types. So, for example, we scan 
most news articles only briefly, while reading only few in depth; we 
skip most web-pages but stop and examine a few in more detail [14]; and 
we abandon many downloaded pieces of music rapidly, while listening to 
end only of a few [15]. And considering people in aggregate, of course, 
the same skewed distribution of “attention” also occurs: a small number 
of paintings, movies, books, or musical compositions receive a huge 
amount of attention; the vast majority are lost in obscurity and 
scarcely attended to by anyone. Indeed, such lop-sided patterns even 
have a characteristic mathematical form (a so-called “power law”), 
which is observed for music downloads, books sales, movie receipts and 
many more [16].  
 
For art forms which are inherently extended in time, such as music, 
film, or the novel, such careful allocation of our time only to the 
most interesting examples makes sense. But, as we’ve seen, viewing a 
painting is also a temporally extended act and necessarily so. Despite 
our intuitions to the contrary, rather than taking in an entire 
painting a single glance, we experience it as a series---perhaps a long 
series---of glimpses. It seems that not all paintings justify the time 
and effort required not merely to interrogate its meaning, but to 
explore its basic visual properties.  
 
What can we conclude? That our sense of having a complete conscious 
experience of Breughel’s painting, or any other, is a fake, conjured 
out of an extended stream of visual fragments. It is, though, a fake 
that is created with good reason, to convey correctly the impression of 
a stable an external world. To return to our initial question: the 
operation of vision is, in part, why looking at a painting takes so 
long. Despite our phenomenological intuitions to the contrary, we 
cannot even see, let along interpret, a painting in a single glance. 
Breughel is, of course, an illusionist, turning paint into an imitation 
of a three-dimensional world; and our brain too is an illusionist, 
creating a subjective sense of a rich, colorful, unchanging world from 
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